The repression against the Kurdish people
1-INTRODUCTION
1. The report analysis the implementation of the recommendations
adopted at the third Periodic Review of Türkiye (May 2010). The
conclusion is that Türkiye has not implemented the
recommendations it accepted.
2. Due to the fear of the “division of the state,” Türkiye refuses to
recognize a range of cultural rights of ethnic and religious minorities,
especially the Kurds.
3. Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution, which states that «The
State of Türkiye, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity,
and its language is Turkish» and Article 66 states that «Everyone
bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a
Turk.»[1]
4. The reports published by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in February 2017 [2] and March 2018 [3], as well as
reports published by the Council of Europe and the European Union
raise the concern about Türkiye’s practices against the Kurdish
lawyers, dissenting academics or politicians, civil society
organizations, university students, the media and journalists.
5. The report also analyzes the dangerous concentration of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The Constitution
stipulates that «The President exercises executive power in
accordance with the Constitution and laws»; the government
arbitrarily uses it in order to implement a political agenda. The
Turkish authorities do not implement the rulings of the Turkish
Constitutional Court, of the European Court of Human Rights and the
recommendations made by the UN Treaty Bodies[4] concerning the
detention conditions of Abdullah Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili
Yıldırım, and Veysi Aktaş on Imrali Island.
6. Furthermore, following the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, in the
framework of the state of emergency, Türkiye has issued a significant
number of decrees that have been incorporated in the legislation
after the lifting of the state of emergency.
7. European[5] and UN human rights bodies have expressed their
concerns about the violation of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression and have called on Türkiye to respect this right in
conformity with international law and the treaties to which the state
has acceded. Media outlets banned by decrees issued during the
state of emergency have not been allowed to reopen after the lifting
of the law[6].
8. The report emphasizes Türkiye’s racist approaches towards
religious and cultural minorities, such as Kurds, Armenians, and
towards those forced to take refuge in Türkiye after the start of the
war in Syria, such as Alevis and Yezidis. Moreover, the human rights
violations committed by Türkiye in its military operations in regions
where Kurds live in Northern Iraq and North-East Syria are
significant.
9. The report highlights the disproportionate use of force by the
Turkish security forces against peaceful manifestations, in particular
in South-Eastern Türkiye against the Kurdish people. Manifestations
against the government’s practices are banned on the grounds of
«security» based on Law No. 2911 [7].
– 2 –
10. The report includes analyses of torture, ill-treatment, prolonged
isolation, lack of medical care to sick prisoners and suspicious deaths
in custody and prisons.
11. The report also emphasizes the impunity enjoyed by the Turkish
military forces responsible of human rights violations and crimes
committed in the city centres destroyed during the operations
carried out against the Kurds in South-East Türkiye. Additionally, it
contains analyses regarding the civilians displaced during these
operations and those who lost their homes because of Türkiye’s
operations targeting North-East Syria.
12. Finally, the report asses the discriminatory approaches of
Türkiye during the earthquake that occurred in Kurdish provinces in
February 2023 and the failure to ensure the return of those who
were displaced.
METHODOLOGY
13. The report of the third Periodic Review of Türkiye has been
examined and an analysis has been conducted on the
recommendations that were fulfilled and those that were
insufficiently implemented.
14. Additionally, interviews were conducted with the Human Rights
Association (IHD) in Türkiye, Media and Law Studies Association
(MLSA), People’s Democratic Party’s (HDP), and the Freedom for
Lawyers Association, as well as with some lawyers and civilians
affected by Türkiye actions in South-Eastern Türkiye. IHD’s annual
reports were also examined.
15. Interviews were also conducted with the lawyers and families of
the prisoners held in Imrali Prison.
15, Rue des Savoises1205 Genève Tel (022) 328 19 84
Email: info@kurd-chr.ch /kurd.chr.geneve@gmail.comWeb: www.kurd-chr.ch
KURD-CHR
CENTRE KURDE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
ETHNICITY AND MINORITIES
16. The 1923 Lausanne Treaty recognizes minorities only as
“monotheistic” religions, with the exception of four recognized
religious beliefs. The process of establishing the Republic of Türkiye
was characterized by compulsory Turkification policies. Therefore,
the Turkish Constitution advocates a monolithic and “Turkishness”
ideology.
17. With the establishment of the Republic, displacement and
assimilation policies towards non-Turkish Muslim communities were
adopted as a fundamental approach. The largest group, the Kurdish
people, faced both physical annihilation policies and simultaneous
assimilation. Until the 2000’s, systematic efforts were made to erode
the Kurdish language and culture.
18. Despite declared formal changes in policies and approaches
towards minorities due to relations with the European Union, there
have been no substantive changes in reality. Türkiye’s approach
towards minorities continues with multi-faceted political, military,
social, and cultural tools, ranging from annihilation and denial to
assimilation.
– 3 –
19. After the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, everything related to
Kurdish culture and language was banned under decrees issued
during the State of Emergency (OHAL).
20. Based on the powers granted by the State of Emergency,
trustees were appointed to municipalities governed by the Peace and
Democracy Party. These appointments ended the provision of
multilingual municipal services. Kurdish was removed from municipal
websites, Kurdish language support houses were closed and Kurdish
street and place names were replaced with Turkish ones. These
practices continued with trustees appointed to
municipalities governed by the HDP after 2019.
21. The Kurdish daily newspaper Azadiya Welat was shut down by
decree. The Kurdish children’s TV channel Zarok TV was also closed
but later reopened due to public backlash. Furthermore, Kurdish
schools, the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, the Kurdish Cultural Research
and Development Association (KURDÎ-DER) branches, and other
associations and organizations using Kurdish language were closed.
Kurdish news agencies and newspapers like Dicle News Agency
(DİHA) and Jinha were also shut down.
KILLINGS BECAUSE OF SPEAKING KURDISH LANGUAGE
22. The polarisation and homogenisation policies pursued by the
Turkish government led to numerous racist attacks on those speaking
Kurdish, in different places and social contexts. Here are some
examples:
· in Aydın, a student named Pınar Çetinkaya was expelled from her
dormitory for speaking Kurdish;
· Fikret Aydemir was attacked by a group of racist soldiers in Ağrı while
doing his compulsory military service because he spoke Kurdish;
· Kadir Sakçı and his son Burhan Sakçı were attacked in Sakarya
because they spoke Kurdish (the father died and the son was
seriously injured);
· in Sakarya’s Karasu district, 19-year-old Şirin Tosun and his friend
Mahsun Zeren, who were working as seasonal agricultural workers,
were attacked by eight people because they greeted each other in
Kurdish (Tosun died after being in intensive care for 54 days);
· Ekrem Yaşlı (74) and his wife Bedriye Yaşlı (71) were attacked by
another patient’s companion in Çanakkale Hospital because speaking
Kurdish after surgery;
· Barış Çakan (20) was killed by a group in the Etimesgut district of
Ankara because he was listening to Kurdish music in a park.
– 4 –
PRESSURE AND OBSTACLES ON KURDISH CULTURE AND ART
23. Kurdish cultural activities have often been banned. Numerous
examples could be given, but within the scope of this report, we will
limit ourselves to a few examples:
· on 23 July 2019, a concert by Kurdish artist Mem Ararat was banned
by the Van Governor’s Office;
· on 8 October 2019, seven musicians were arrested in Urfa’s Viranşehir
district for singing Kurdish songs at weddings, accused of “making
propaganda for an organization”;
· on 21 January 2020, Grup Munzur was sentenced to 10 months in
prison in Van for singing Kurdish songs at Newroz celebrations in
2017;
· on 20 September 2020, Mezopotamya Cultural Center artist Weysi
Ermiş was arrested for singing Kurdish songs at rallies;
· on 13 October 2020, a Kurdish literature talk planned by Avesta
Publishing with author Mîrza Metîn in Mardin was blocked by the
police;
· on 13 November 2020, the Kurdish play “Bêrû,” staged by Istanbul
City Theatres, was banned by the Governor’s Office, and the play was
also banned the next day in Urfa;
· on 16 October 2021, Kadıköy District Governorship banned the
concert organized by the Mezopotamya Cultural Center to celebrate
its 30th anniversary at the Bostancı Cultural Center;
· on 25 July 2024, nine Kurdish youths were arrested in Mersin for
singing Kurdish folk songs and dancing on the beach; during their
detention they were subjected to psychological torture by being
forced to listen to the song “I Die for Türkiye”;
· on 26 July 2024, six women were detained in Ağrı’s Doğubayazıt
district by “anti-terrorism” police for singing and dancing at a Kurdish
wedding ceremony; they were released to be tried without detention;
· on 27 July 2024, six people, including two 17-year-olds, were
arrested in Siirt for singing Kurdish songs and dancing; they were
released on August 16 with a ban on leaving the country;
· on 30 July 2024, 18 people were detained in Istanbul for
singing Kurdish songs and dancing at weddings; eleven of them were
arrested and sent to prison;
· on 29 July 2024, a soldier was detained in Istanbul’s Arnavutköy
district for dancing a Kurdish halay; this kind of arrests also took
place in Batman and Antalya.
RACIST ATTACKS ON MINORITIES AND REFUGEES
24. Kurds, Armenians, Yazidis, Greeks, and Syriacs are indigenous
peoples of Türkiye. Despite having a distinct language, culture, and
identity, Kurds are constitutionally considered Turkish and despite
the fact that they are more than 20 million, they cannot freely live
their culture and cannot speak their language due to their identity
and are subjected to racist approaches, as illustrated above.
Armenians, Yazidis, Greeks, and Syriacs have seen significant
population declines due to forced migrations.
– 5 –
25. There has been a significant increase in the number of refugees
in Türkiye. According to UNHCR, Türkiye currently hosts some 3.2
million registered Syrian refugees along with close to 222,000
persons of concern from other nationalities.[8] Due to the increase
in the number of refugees, Türkiye often uses them as leverage in
international relations, threatening to send them to other countries
and thus violating human rights with impunity. Depending on the
political situation, the government can create grounds for nationalist
groups to attack refugees.
26. The Centre for Socio-Political Field Research, in its 2023 report
on racist attacks against Kurds, Alevis and refugees, notes that at
least 208 racist/exclusionary/denial news stories appeared in the
media throughout the year, drawing attention to the numerous
attacks incited by the rhetoric of both the government
and opposition. It also highlights discriminatory approaches toward
immigrant communities and Alevi villages in the earthquake zones of
2023. The report analyses the discrimination faced by Kurds in
sports arenas, prisons, and metropolises, where they have been
subjected to racist motivations and violent attacks. According to the
research, the issue of Kurdish language suppression was reflected in
the Turkish media. During the same period, there were at least 50
attacks on refugees, and 13 attacks were carried out against
Alevis.[9]
27. Türkiye has historically adopted racism as a policy against ethnic
groups such as Kurds and Armenians, using it as a platform for
attacks by Turkish nationalists. Oppressive policies towards Kurdish
and Armenian institutions are always on the agenda. For example,
information and images shared on social media show that on 2 April
2023 three workers in Bodrum, Muğla, were subjected to verbal and
physical attacks because they were Kurdish and “spoke Kurdish”.
Similarly, on the same day in Bursa’s İnegöl district, before a
Bursaspor-İnegölspor football match, a group of Bursaspor fans
attacked a vehicle with a 21 (Diyarbakır) license plate. In addition,
Amedspor, a legal sports club in Türkiye’s first league, has been
subjected to racist attacks at every away game. While supporters of
all other teams are allowed to attend away matches, Amedspor
supporters are banned from doing so because the team represents
the Kurdish majority.
28. Before the 2022 elections, the governmental and opposition’s
anti-refugee election propaganda increased racist attacks on Syrian
refugees in Türkiye. On the one hand, there were increased human
rights violations in deportation centres and, on the other hand,
there were increased attacks by extreme nationalist groups. On 30
June 2024, racist attacks against Syrians began in Kayseri and
continued in Istanbul, Antalya, and other provinces.
– 6 –
THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE
29. According to the Turkish Constitution, the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches are independent. Article 11 of the Constitution
states that «The provisions of the Constitution shall be binding upon
the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, administrative
authorities and other institutions and individuals. Laws shall not be
in conflict with the Constitution». However, the supremacy of
international law over domestic law is also recognized.
30. In practice, the judiciary has lost its independence. The Turkish
government uses the judiciary as a tool to repress the democratic
opposition (including Kurdish elected people), intellectuals,
academics, lawyers, media and journalists.
31. The Constitutional Court, as the highest judicial authority,
interprets decisions based on the whims of the presidency and the
coalition of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and
Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The Turkish government has ignored
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding
Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, as well as the ECHR’s decision
on Abdullah Öcalan, the Constitutional Court’s rulings on Can Atalay
and Osman Kavala, and the decisions of the UN Human Rights
Committee and UN CAT regarding Abdullah Öcalan and other
prisoners serving aggravated life sentences. Instead, the Turkish
authorities initiated new trials or imposed penalties through local
courts to invalidate the decisions of international courts.
32. The Turkish judiciary operates entirely as an institution of the
Turkish government. After the 7 June 2015 elections, when HDP
made significant electoral gains, Türkiye ended the democratic
solution process and began to pursue a repressive policy against
Kurdish democratic opposition and institutions. Turkish courts
launched numerous cases, particularly against Kurds, Kurdish
democratic political parties and civil society organizations.
33. At the instigation of President Erdoğan, on 2 October 2015 the
Ankara Heavy Penal Court opened a case against 108 people,
including the co-chairs of the HDP, who were arrested and
imprisoned along with some members of parliament,
politicians, and civil society representatives.
34. A particular case is the Kobane case which was initiated after
HDP Executive Board called on the public and especially the Turkish
government to be sensitive to the situation when ISIS besieged
Kobane on 13 September 2014 and committed massacres. Because
these events coincided with the democratic solution and peace talks
between the Turkish government and Kurdish representatives, no
reaction was given by the Turkish government and judiciary at the
time.
35. However, the democratic actions carried out in support of
Kobane were clamped down on by the security forces, and 37 people
lost their lives during the events of 6-8 October 2014.
36. Despite the ECHR’s ruling that Selahattin Demirtaş did not
receive a fair trial and should be released, Turkish President
Erdoğan, on 16 May 2024, imposed various sentences on 24
Kurdish-origin politicians by directing the judiciary on numerous
occasions. The unjust sentences handed down by Ankara’s 22nd
Heavy Penal Court on 16 May 2024 are listed in Annex 1.
– 7 –
FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION
37. Turkish Constitution fundamentally guarantees the protection of
freedom of opinion and expression, but at the same time articles 25
to 30 of the Constitution, along with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Anti-Terror Law[10], impose restrictions under the pretexts of
“crimes against the State” and “praising terrorism.” Investigations
against politicians, the media, and journalists in Türkiye are mainly
based on these articles.
38. In his visit report (A/HRC/35/22/Add.3) the UN Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Mr. David Kaye,
as an immediate measure of the highest humanitarian
priority, urged the Government to release all those detained in
recent years on the basis of the exercise of their right to freedom of
expression.
39. In his public statement Mr. Kaye stressed that «While the
government’s duty to protect against terrorist threats is critical,
international law mandates respect for human rights in the fight
against terrorism. The provisions in Turkish law regarding
counter-terrorism and national security are being used excessively
broadly and generally to restrict freedom of expression» He also
criticized Law No. 6532, which grants the National Intelligence
Organization (MİT) access to personal data without a court order and,
according to Article 3, gives MIT the authority to collect information,
documents, and data from public institutions, financial
organizations, and entities with or without legal grounds.
40. Similarly, various UN press releases, statements from
international and national civil society organizations, as well as the
Council of Europe and the European Union at various times,
consistently emphasize the need for Türkiye to respect freedom of
opinion and expression. The recommendations put forward at the
third cycle of the Turkish Periodic Review in January 2020 have not
been implemented.
41. Since the AKP came to power, around 1,000 journalists have
been arrested. According to the 2022 media report by the
Contemporary Journalists Association’s Media Monitoring
Commission, at least 174 cases related to journalists and media
outlets were heard in 2022. In these cases, 263 journalists were
tried; at least 52 journalists were sentenced to a total of 92 years,
11 months, and 15 days of imprisonment plus fines. Additionally, 61
journalists were attacked or detained while performing their duties.
[11]
42. The basis for prosecutions against the Kurdish press, politicians,
and artists is clearly rooted in journalistic activities, freedom of
information, and freedom of opinion and expression. Reporting on
press releases, publishing interviews or covering human rights
violations committed by security forces are presented as evidence of
participation in “terrorist organization” activities.
43. Most of these cases are based on specific
expressions, possession of newspapers and magazines, computer
records, phone taps, and secret witness statements. On 7 June 2022,
an operation targeting Kurdish media institutions was conducted,
resulting in the detention of 30 journalists. After an eight-day
detention period, 16 journalists were arrested.
– 8 –
44. According to data from the Human Rights Foundation of Türkiye
(TİHV), 84 journalists were detained, 19 were arrested, one
journalist was deported, and one journalist was denied entry into
Türkiye in 2023. As of 4 December 2023, at least 41 journalists were
in prison. This number reached approximately 70 during the first
five months of 2024. According to TİHV Documentation Center’s
data, in the first 11 months of 2023, 3,446 contents and 362 sites
were blocked. Due to social media posts, 1,731 people, including
four children, were detained, 457 were arrested, and 29 were
released under judicial control. Additionally, during this period, 43
channels were fined administratively, 38 programs were suspended,
and one channel was suspended for seven days. There were also
raids on a publishing house, a production company, and a newspaper
office. Eight books were ordered to be confiscated, and two
children’s books were restricted. Twenty-eight artists were tried in
cases opened against them.
45. Over the twelve months preceding May 2023 dual presidential
and single parliamentary elections, operations were conducted
against lawyers, politicians, and journalists. The Mapping Media
Freedom database recorded 27 warnings affecting 91 Kurdish
journalists, media workers, or organizations in the last 12 months.
These warnings mostly resulted in arrests, detention, imprisonment,
prosecutions, and convictions. At that time, Human Rights Watch and
the International PEN, along with 26 international NGOs, issued a
statement demanding an end to the pressures on the Kurdish press.
46. The most recent operations against the Kurdish
press were conducted before and after the March 2024 local
elections. When the AKP governmental party did not achieve the
desired results, the pressures on Kurds increased more than ever.
Before the municipal elections, President Erdoğan, during a rally in
Diyarbakır, stated «I have not forgotten that you gave 70% of the
vote to the opposition presidential candidate in the presidential
elections» signaling his intentions after the elections. On 23 April
2024, police raids were carried out in Istanbul, Ankara, and Şanlıurfa
against journalists from the pro-Kurdish Mezopotamya News Agency
and Yeni Yaşam newspaper, resulting in the detention of nine
journalists. The detainees were denied access to their lawyers for 24
hours. A confidentiality order was placed on their files, but based on
previous experiences, it is believed that their reporting and
interviews are being used as grounds for accusations of terrorism
propaganda.
47. Repression against individuals for their opinions is not limited to
the press. Members of political parties, parliamentarians, and
associations and groups carrying out democratic actions are also
targeted. Social media posts criticizing the presidency and state
administration also lead to prosecutions.
– 9 –
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN DETENTION CENTRES
48. According to the official website of the Directorate General of
Prisons and Detention Houses, as of 1
st July 2024, there are 272
closed penal institutions, 99 independent open penal institutions, 4
juvenile training centres, 11 women’s closed penal institutions, 8
women’s open penal institutions and 9 juvenile and youth closed
penal institutions in Türkiye, totalling 403 penal institutions with a
capacity of 295,328 people.
49. As of 1
st July 2024, a total of 342,526 people were
being held in these detention centres, including 14,530 women,
3,214 children, and 5,018 people over 65 years old. [12]
50. Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that «All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person». Similarly, Article 1 of the UN Basic Principles for
the Treatment of Prisoners states that «All prisoners shall be treated
with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human
beings». Similar provisions exist in Turkish penal and enforcement
laws.
51. Reports from the Human Rights Association (IHD), the Freedom
for Lawyers Association (ÖHD), the Human Rights Foundation of
Türkiye (TİHV), and interviews with some detainees’ families reveal
that physical assaults, threats, beatings, strip searches, ill-treatment
during cell searches, racist and discriminatory approaches, death
threats, torture, and forced transfers to solitary cells are common.
There are also reports of forced standing in military formation,
violations of health and medical treatment rights, arbitrary bans and
practices. Unable to find a solution to their problems, prisoners are
forced to resort to hunger strikes and death fasts in response to
unbearable human rights violations.
52. One of the most serious problems during this period has been
the practice of strip searches and inspecting prisoners’ mouths
during searches. Prisoners who refuse to undergo strip searches are
subjected to torture, their clothes are torn, and they are forcibly
stripped. Prisoners are asked to kneel and those who refuse are
subjected to physical assault and torture. Additionally, prisoners are
prosecuted for resisting prison staff and their complaints are
dismissed with the response “no grounds for prosecution”, effectively
closing their cases. Although Türkiye claimed during the July 2024
examination by CAT that it had changed strip searches to “detailed
searches” in the law, the practice remains exactly the same.
OBSERVATION AND CLASSIFICATION BOARDS
53. On 29 December 2020, a regulation on “Observation
and Classification Centres and the Evaluation of Convicts” entered
into effect, establishing Boards that evaluate the “good behaviour” of
prisoners every six months. Those Boards are chaired by the
institution’s director and include the deputy director, administrative
officer, prison doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker,
teacher and chief guard. The Boards evaluate whether a prisoner
had a good behaviour or not, effectively acting as a court deciding
whether they can benefit from conditional release and supervised
freedom.
– 10 –
54. According to statements from prisoners’ families and prisoners
whose releases have been postponed, the observation boards make
abstract and subjective comments in their evaluations of prisoners.
They demand expressions of regret from political prisoners. Since
the regulation came into effect, 384 convicts have had their
conditional release and parole postponed by the decisions of the
Observation Boards.
55. Observation Boards often cite disciplinary penalties as the legal
basis for postponing release decisions. Prison administrations initiate
disciplinary investigations by recording reports in response to any
demand for respect of rights or reactions against violations of rights.
Sometimes even greeting one another in Kurdish, singing Kurdish
songs, or dancing a traditional Kurdish “halay” are interpreted as
“organizational communication”, “propaganda for an organization,” or
“slogan shouting”, leading to disciplinary investigations.
56. Sharing rights’ violations experienced in prisons with families,
civil society organizations or lawyers is considered a crime and can
result in further investigations. According to families’ accounts, in
some prisons, inmates are subjected to oral cavity searches during
social activities, trips to the infirmary, transfers to the hospital,
during roll call, or searches. Seriously ill prisoners are
handcuffed during medical examinations when taken to the hospital.
In some prisons, inmates are forced to undergo strip searches and
refusal of this humiliating practice can be used as a basis for
disciplinary investigations.
57. Disciplinary penalties can result in solitary confinement,
placement in padded cells, isolation from family and lawyers, and
prevention of weekly phone calls for arbitrary period. The most
critical issue is that Observation Boards use these investigations and
penalties as grounds to revoke convicts’ sentences and strip them of
their supervised freedom rights. Even seriously ill prisoners, with
only one year left of their sentences and good behaviour, are
sometimes subjected to arbitrary treatment and their sentences are
extended.
58. This policy is most strictly applied in Imrali Island Prison against
Abdullah Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar, Veysi Aktaş, and Hamili Yıldırım,
who are serving their sentences since 15 February 1999. In many
occasions, Abdullah Öcalan has faced interruptions in his meetings
with lawyers and family for various reasons. However, since 25 March
2021 he hasn’t had any contact with his lawyers and his family; no
news has been received from him and the three other prisoners in
Imrali.
59. During July 2024 CAT session, Turkish officials cited the
disciplinary penalties imposed since March 2024 as the reason for
this. When CAT members asked whether continuous disciplinary
penalties had been applied for four years, the Turkish delegation did
not replay. The treatment undergone by Abdullah Öcalan, Hayri
Konar, Hamili Yıldırım, and Veysi Aktaş constitutes a form of torture.
60. Some Kurdish political prisoners whose sentences expired during
the period under review (after May 2020) are still being held in
prison as a result of disciplinary measures taken by their respective
Observation Boards.
61. A significant number of deaths, as a result of the repression of
Kurdish prisoners (see Annex 2), is a very worrying phenomenon
observed in Turkish detention centres.
– 11 –
AGGRAVATED LIFE IMPRISONMENT (WITHOUT PAROLE)
62. In 2004, the death penalty was entirely abolished in Türkiye,
and aggravated life imprisonment was introduced instead. Article
5275 of the Law on the Execution of Penalties and Security Measures
regulates the execution of life imprisonment without parole.
However, it is applied differently to political prisoners than to other
convicts.
63. Political prisoners face excessive measures, including being held
in solitary confinement. If they have not received any disciplinary
penalties, they are allowed out for one hour a day. Disciplinary
penalties are applied arbitrarily. Political prisoners sentenced to
aggravated life imprisonment under Article 5275 of the law are
confined to high-security prisons, in solitary confinement for the rest
of their lives and will never regain their freedom. In contrast, those
sentenced to life imprisonment for other crimes may be released
after 24 years and those sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment
may be released after 30 years, based on the decision of the prison’s
Observation Boards.
64. This law is commonly referred to as the “Öcalan Law”. All
violations and unlawful regulations developed against prisoners in
Türkiye were first applied to Abdullah Öcalan.
65. As long as the problem was centred on Öcalan, there were no
reactions against these measures, either domestically or
internationally. The Turkish government took advantage of this
silence in order to apply the same practice to all Kurdish political
prisoners. All the legal abuses and human rights violations initiated
against Öcalan have thus become standard practice. This law,
introduced to ensure that Abdullah Öcalan (imprisoned in Imrali
Island Prison since 1999) spends the rest of his life in prison, has
since been applied to all those sentenced to aggravated life
imprisonment. It not only extinguishes any hope of
liberation but also constitutes a form of torture.
66. In its Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic report of
Türkiye[13], the CAT invites Türkiye to « consider revising the Penal
Code and Law No. 5275 on the Execution of Penalties and Security
Measures to abolish the penalty of aggravated life imprisonment.»
Furthermore, the Committee stresses that «In this regard, the State
party should ensure that prisoners serving life sentences have the
prospect of release or a reduction in their sentence after a
reasonable period of time».
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN KURDISH AREA
67. The above mentioned 2017 report of the OHCHR relates that
355,000 people were displaced due to Turkish security forces’
operations in South-eastern Türkiye, with approximately 35,000
homes destroyed in Sur alone. The report highlights severe human
rights violations. The High Commissioner’s request to visit the region
was denied by the Turkish government. Those responsible for these
serious human rights violations were not only left unpunished but
were also rewarded, while Kurdish politicians were prosecuted.
– 12 –
68. Since Türkiye has invaded and illegally occupies a strip of 300
km. long and 30 km. large along the Turkish border in North-East
Syria, numerous and serious human rights violations have been
reported by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, by some civil
society organizations and the press. Reports from Northern Iraq
(particularly in Kurdish regions) seem to indicate that Türkiye is also
responsible of similar violations there. According to the said
Commission, Turkish-backed forces abduct, rape and disappear Kurds
or ransom them back to their families.
69. Türkiye, by completely occupying Afrin, Grespi, and Serekaniye
in Northern Syria, displaced around 400,000 Kurds, forcing them to
settle in a barren area of Shehba. The homes forcibly
abandoned by the Kurdish families have been given to Arab Syrian
families coming from the refugee camps in Türkiye. The properties
and assets of the Kurdish people were confiscated and the names of
municipalities and settlements in these areas were changed. The
Turkish-backed military forces apply pressure policies against the
Kurds.
70. Since the 1990s, Türkiye has established military bases in
Northern Iraq under the pretext of security policies. Reports also
indicate that in Türkiye’s operations in Northern Iraq, people have
been forced to leave their homes. With the support of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party and the silence of the Iraqi government, the
Turkish security forces have committed human rights violations in
Northern Iraq.
71. Türkiye bombs residential areas under the pretext of “fighting
terrorism” and conducts military operations and forces villages to be
evacuated. Türkiye’s bombing of Perex village on 20 July 2022, led
the Iraqi government to appeal to the UN Security Council, which
condemned the attack.
72. In 2022, Iraqi Chief of General Staff Abdulemir Yarela stated in a
special session of the Iraqi Parliament that as of 2022, Türkiye had
around 100 military bases and approximately 4,000 soldiers in
Northern Iraq. As a result of joint efforts by Türkiye and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party, 85 villages were evacuated in Kurdish
regions. Between 14 April 2022 and 14 July 2022, Türkiye carried
out 2,574 airstrikes and 1,933 helicopter bombardments.
73. Türkiye military and security forces serious and numerous
violations of human rights in the Kurdish area (in Türkiye, Syria and
Iraq) may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, which
at the moment are ongoing with impunity. Türkiye has not adhered
to the Rome Statute.
RECOMMENDATIONS
74. In the light of the facts outlined above, MRAP and Kurd-CHR
recommend that Türkiye:
i. fully respects the provisions of the Treaties it has
adhered to and implement the Committees’
recommendations;
ii. implements July 2024 CAT recommendations, including
amending the Anti-Terror Law and abolishing Article 5275 of
the Law on the Execution of Penalties and Security Measures,
particularly the provisions related to aggravated life
imprisonment and disciplinary offenses;
– 13 –
iii. adheres to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance and makes the declaration
provided for in Article 32;
iv. gives immediate access to lawyers and family members of
detainees held in solitary confinement in Imrali Island prison
(Abdullah Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili Yıldırım, and
Veysi Aktaş),
v. guarantees the constitutional protection of identity, language,
and cultural rights for minorities and other ethnic groups to
freely express themselves;
vi. amends Article 3 of the Constitution in order to ensure that all
ethnic groups can receive education and conduct their affairs
in their native languages;
vii. takes the necessary measures to stop the use of torture in the
detentions centres and ensures independent and impartial
investigations of all allegations involving the torture and other
ill or inhuman treatment of prisoners;
viii. fully implements the standing invitation made in March 2001
to the Human Rights Council’s special procedures and respect
the 2016 terms of reference for country visits;
ix. puts an end to the cross-border operations in
North-East Syria and Northern Iraq and withdraw from those
territories;
x. adheres to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court;
xi. considers engaging in a constructive dialogue with Kurdish
representatives, including Abdullah Öcalan, in order to find a
peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue.
[1] https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=2709&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5
[2]
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHR_South-East_TürkiyeR
eport_10March2017.pdf
[3]
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/TR/2018-03-19_Second_OHCHR
_Türkiye_Report.pdf
[4] In particular those of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture (CAT)
[5]
https://www.coe.int/fr/web/commissioner/-/t%C3%BCrkiye-reverse-a-critically-hostile-environm
ent-for-freedom-of-expression-and-for-journalists-human-rights-defenders-and-civil-society
[6] https://www.ihd.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/OHAL-KHKlar%C4%B1-Raporu.pdf
[7] https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=2911&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5
[8] https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey
[9] https://www.kurd-chr.ch/earthquakes-and-human-rights-violations-in-Türkiye/
[10] 1.5.3713.pdf (mevzuat.gov.tr)
[11]
https://www.paraanaliz.com/2023/genel/turkiyede-gazetecilik-raporu-20-yilda-tutuklanan-gazet
eci-sayisi-848-g-44814/
[12]
https://www.ihd.org.tr/marmara-bolgesi-hapishaneleri-hak-ihlalleri-raporu-nisan-mayis-haziran2024/
15, Rue des Savoises1205 Genève Tel (022) 328 19 84
Email: info@kurd-chr.ch /kurd.chr.geneve@gmail.comWeb: www.kurd-chr.ch
KURD-CHR
CENTRE KURDE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
[13] CAT/C/TUR/CO/5Turkey report – human rights -2024
15, Rue des Savoises1205 Genève Tel (022) 328 19 84
Email: info@kurd-chr.ch /kurd.chr.geneve@gmail.com Web: www.kurd-chr.ch
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